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This paper studies whether microfinance rating agencies are able to impose market discipline by 
rating Microfinance Institutions’ performance. Results indicate that not all rating agencies are 
equal as only one rater imposed market discipline by promoting better sustainability and offered 
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Recent years witnessed the emergence and growth of a number of rating agencies specializing in 
rating microfinance institutions (MFIs).
1  In the absence of developed equity and debt markets, 
donors and investors could benefit from independent evaluation of the performance of MFIs.  
Microfinance institutions themselves could benefit from rating if it helps them attract additional 
funds.  To date, however, the impact of rating on MFI performance and their ability to raise 
funds has not been explored.  This paper is the first to focus on these issues by analyzing a new 
database consisting of new publicly available data containing financial and outreach information 
of MFIs from 62 countries, and private data collected from microfinance rating agencies.  
The purpose of microfinance rating agencies is to generate independent information, 
which could be used by existing stakeholders to improve governance, and by potential investors 
to make appropriate investment decisions.  Rating helps impose market discipline by producing 
and revealing information and, thus, encouraging better management.  However, rating could 
lead to moral hazard, at least in short term, if managers of MFIs who have received good rating 
and, as a consequence investor support, decide to slack off and exercise less effort.  The risk of 
moral hazard with microfinance rating is similar to that induces by deposit insurance schemes.  
Deposit insurance is designed to prevent bank runs by protecting the interest of small, dispersed 
depositors, but it can lead to moral hazard because depositors whose savings are guaranteed may 
fail to monitor and influence the financial institution that has their money (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2004).    2
Well run microfinance institutions make better use of scarce funds by providing better 
financial services and reaching more poor clients. Exploring whether microfinance rating 
improves MFIs’ performance is important because there are few alternative mechanisms that 
promote MFI accountability.  Recent study found that about 90% of the one billion dollars that 
funded microfinance initiatives has come from public money, mainly from taxpayers in 
developed countries (Foreign Investment In Microfinance: Debt and Equity from Quasi-
Commercial Investors, CGAP Focus Note 25, January 2004).  Donors and investors in 
microfinance are searching for effective mechanism of external control and some have focused 
on rating.  To support rating of MFIs, in May 2001, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP) established a special fund with the purpose to subsidize rating of MFIs (see 
http//:www.ratingfund.org).  Thus, from policy perspective a study on the impact of 
microfinance rating agencies and their ability to serve as an effective mechanism of external 
control is timely and important.  
Exploring the role of rating in microfinance is also important in the context of 
discussions on the ability of market forces to discipline banks and financial intermediaries.  
Specifically, this literature focuses on the consequences from interaction of regulator-imposed 
rules, rating agency signals and market discipline.  These issues are especially relevant in 
microfinance, where market discipline through equity and debt prices is weak but where 
regulatory involvement often imposes significant distortions. 
This paper develops a new database of 130 MFIs operating in 62 countries and analyses 
the performance of MFIs by adopting an empirical approach used in studies on the impact of 
market forces, rating, and regulation on performance in financial intermediaries.  The main 
conclusions that the paper draws is that not all microfinance rating agencies are the same and   3
that individual raters differ in their impact on MFI performance and ability to raise funds.  The 
evidence on the impact of subsidized rating is somewhat weak but it indicates that subsidizing 
may lead to moral hazard in terms of MFI outreach. 
The paper is organized as follows: section two reviews the literature on rating, section 
three describes the empirical specifications, section four describes the data, section five discusses 
the results, and section six offers concluding remarks.  
 
Review of the Relevant Literature  
Credit rating agencies such as Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s etc. rate CDs, debentures
2, and 
commercial paper.  Credit rating agencies also rate banks and other financial intermediaries often 
because regulators require bank rating for some types of activities.  For example, in the US 
banks need rating to issue letters of credit (De Yong, Flannery, Lang., and Sorescu, 2001). 
The purpose of credit rating agencies is to help impose market discipline. Sironi (2003) 
argues that markets can discipline banks and financial intermediaries if private investors observe 
and price the risk of these institutions so that management decisions are affected by the price 
signals.  Credit rating influences the price of debt directly and it produces information useful to 
equity holder because equity studies find that investors incorporate promptly relevant rating 
information in bank stock prices (DeYong, Flannery, Lang., and Sorescu, 2001). 
Bliss and Flannery (2001) distinguish between market monitoring as the process of 
correctly understanding and pricing changes in risk profile, and market influence as the impact 
that changes in prices have on managers’ behavior.  Kwast et al. (1999) argue that market 
influence can be in the forms of direct market discipline through the cost of capital as a function   4
of banks’ risk profile, and in banking, indirect market discipline through the impact of 
supervisor’s actions motivated by the yields on banks’ risk sensitive sources of funds.  
Rating has value if it produces information in addition to what the markets already know. 
In the case of banks and financial intermediaries, the ability of markets to generate price signals 
that correctly reflect risk is influenced by regulatory involvement through the bank supervisory 
authority.  Specifically, if a regulator providers explicit or implicit guarantees, market signals 
may be distorted, and the market may fail to play disciplining role.  
The predominant view in the empirical literature is that, at least in the US, regulatory 
interventions should co-exist with credit rating (an earlier review of the literature is Flannery, 
1998).  Morgan and Stiroh (2000) find virtually identical relationship between bond spreads 
(over Treasuries) and risk (estimated by rating agencies) between banks and non-bank firms and 
conclude that, in spite the information opacity of banks, rating agencies are able to value bank 
debt correctly and thus discipline banks as harshly they discipline non-bank firms. 
Morgan (2002) finds, however, that in the US there are patterns of disagreement between 
different rating agencies in terms of their evaluation of various individual banks’ bonds and that 
disagreements increased after the demise of the “too-big-to-fail” policy in 1986; that is, after the 
regulator curtailed its commitment to help big banks in trouble.  Morgan concludes that banks 
are inherently opaque and regulatory involvement is warranted but that rating helps the regulator 
to identifying problem banks. 
Berger, Davis, and Flannery (2000) find that supervisors and investors are fairly 
specialized regarding the information they generate.  For example, supervisors and bond rating 
agencies are more concerned with bankruptcy risk and predict well future problem loans.  In   5
contrast, supervisory assessment and equity market indicators are not strongly related, and equity 
predicts better future earnings, consistent with equity holders’ focus on wealth creation.  
Cross-country empirical studies are rare.  For the case of European banks, Sironi (2003) 
finds that investors impose market discipline, to a lesser extent on banks with external subsidies, 
and that public sector banks benefit from significant government subsidy (through implicit 
guarantees) but these subsidies became weaker in time.  The policy conclusions she draws are 
that requiring banks to issue some subordinated notes and debentures (which are rated) would 
likely enhance market discipline. 
The theoretical literature provides only limited insights regarding the role of credit rating 
agencies.  Nayar (1993) develops arguments in support of voluntary rating against compulsory 
rating.  Kuhner (2001) views rating agencies as information intermediaries and studies their role 
in helping to overcome information asymmetries.  He shows that in periods of increased 
systemic risk credit rating agencies have ability to distinguish between different categories of 
fundamental credit risk but that in general credit rating agencies are developing evidence that the 
market largely agrees with and that this information does not influence the decisions made by 
investors. 
Mukhopadhyay (2003) is concerned with the moral hazard that rating agencies may 
create—once the firm is rated, and funds are secured, managers may not have incentives to 
exercise maximum effort and may slack off.  He shows that incentive payments to the rating 
agency that are based on expected returns on debt will remove the moral hazard problem. 
Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2004) focus on the role of CreditWatch procedures and 
show that it serves as an implicit contractual relationship between a credit rating agency and a 
firm.  They argue that information asymmetries lead to multiple equilibria because a firm can be   6
forced to take any level of risk.  For example, if the market anticipates higher (lower) project risk 
by a firm it will demand higher (lower) coupon rate in the debt contract and induce the firm to 
take higher (lower) risk.  If rating is introduced, the multiple equilibia would disappear because 
the information would be “equalizer” by the rating agency.  
Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits (2004) argue that the mechanism of CreditWatch allows 
the rating agency to interact with the firms it rates and write an implicit contract with the 
management of a firm that is under a threat of having its credit rating changed.  This allows for a 
“deal” between the firm and the credit rating agency where the firm commits to take actions to 
mitigate possible deterioration in rating.  The rating and the implicit contract are incentive 
compatible provided that a group (that is, possible investors) conditions its financing decision on 
the rating.  
These conclusions have implications for microfinance rating where some rating agencies 
such as M-CRIL provide rating that is valid only for certain period of time. Since rating is valid 
for a restricted period investors are more likely to act on it, and thus make the rating agency 
function as information equalizer. 
 
Empirical Specifications 
The literature on rating suggests testable hypotheses for the impact of rating on MFI 
performance.  However, the empirical methodologies used in this literature cannot directly be 
applied to rating in microfinance because MFI differ substantially from banks and other financial 
intermediaries.  For example, most MFIs are not publicly traded companies and, therefore, do 
not have widely held equity.  Equity owners in MFIs are large (international) donors who usually 
do not have an exit strategy (the option of selling stakes), nevertheless, they seek and use   7
performance information in order to make sure that the objective of the MFI are met.  MFI 
creditors also seek information on MFI performance to ensure that their lending is prudent.   
A substantial part of the asset base of most MFIs was created through grants by donors.  
Although donors do not require dividends, they usually continue to monitor the MFI they 
created.  As in other organizations, an MFI will survive if it is able to raise funds and have 
sufficient liquidity to meet current obligations. Therefore, the willingness of donors and creditors 
to provide liquidity and fund future projects is important. Donors and especially creditors, base 
their “good will” on information on the performance of MFIs, usually available through audited 
financial statements. In addition to this information, rating provided by independent market 
participants may affect the willingness of potential equity holders, donors and creditors to fund 
an MFI. Thus, rating in microfinance may play the same disciplining role as rating in banks and 
other financial institutions. 
Yet, MFIs objectives are serving the poor and the emphasis on outreach is also important.  
MFI rating agencies do not rate exclusively debt; instead, microfinance rating agencies develop 
methodologies that focus on the overall performance of the organization in terms of both 
outreach and sustainability.  Thus, studies on the impact of rating in microfinance should account 
for the impact of rating on MFI outreach. 
As many MFis are regulated, regulatory involvement may affect the ability of rating 
agencies to help discipline MFI managers.  In banking, regulators distort market signals because 
of their direct or implicit guarantees that the bank can be rescued even if it does not do very well 
(Sironi, 2003).  In microfinance, similar guarantees may be expected by donors who care about 
the mission of the organization and may provide implicit “guarantees” that the MFI can be 
recapitalized after bad performance. Therefore, all MFIs—regulated, NGO, and non-bank financial institution—may be subject to such distortions, and thus the value of the information 
provided by rating agency may be diminished. 
While general rating agencies rate debt on continuous basis, in microfinance rating is 
more spaced in time and may be expected to last longer, unless otherwise stated (as in the case of 
M-CRILL).  In addition, unlike rating in other industries, rating of MFis has been of a more 
descriptive nature.  Only in 2003 a few rating agencies adopted rating which results in a letter 
grade, and the discussions of the pros and cons is still ongoing
3.  These considerations do not 
permit the application of empirical methods that compare changes in security prices, changes in 
rating and company performance to establish the impact of rating as a disciplining device.  
Therefore, this paper adopts an empirical approach usually employed to study bank 
performance (Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams, and Thorton, 1992; Samolyk, 1994, Barth, Noelle, 
Phumiwasana, and Yago, 2004).  The firt hypothesis suggested by the literature on rating is that 
after being rated MFIs may perform better, if rating functions as an effective disciplining device, 
or slack off, if rating induces moral hazard. Thus, a positive link between rating and performance 
would indicate that rating imposes market discipline, and a negative link would indicate the 
presence of moral hazard. To test this hypothesis the following model is estimated: 
= it P constant it t t it M R B ε φ β α + ′ + ′ + ′ +      (1) 
where Pit is a performance variable for MFI i at time t; Bit is a vector of MFI specific variables 
which include capital ratio (CAPITAL), risk profile (LOAN, PAR, DEBT ), MFI size (SIZE) and 
age (AGE); Rt is a vector of variables that control for rating in the current year (usually based on 
past year performance) and include RATING, Rater1, Rater2, Rater3, Rater4, Rater5 and a 
dummy for received financial aid to pay for the rating (FinAid); Mt are macroeconomic country-
specific variables. 
  8The empirical analysis includes dummies for various raters because some studies of 
rating have attracted attention to the fact that credit agencies differ in their evaluation of 
regulated financial intermediaries (Morgan, 2002), suggesting that it is important to control for 
the quality of the rater.  In addition, since MFIs have a dual objective—outreach and 
sustainability—individual microfinance raters may place different value on these performance 
indicators.  To study the impact of rating on both outreach and sustainability, the empirical 
model is estimated with sustainability indicator (OSS) and outreach indicator (NAB) used as 
explanatory variables. 
The disciplining role of rating also comes from the ability of MFI mangers to use their 
rating to raise additional funds.  The second hypothesis that is being tested is whether rated MFIs 
were able to raise additional funds either through increase in equity or through increase in 
borrowed funds. Thus, the second empirical model that is estimated is: 
= it ChF constant it t t it M R B ε φ β α + ′ + ′ + ′ + −1      (2) 
where ChFit is the log difference of the change in funds and the other variables are as before. In 
this equation all MFI specific variables are lagged one period back.  Two dependent variables are 
used: the first one is the log difference in borrowed funds (LiabCh) other than deposits, in order 
to study the impact of rating on the ability of MFIs to attract large loans; the second dependent 




Data for this study come from several sources. Individual MFI data come from the database 
collected by MIX MARKET information platform (www.mixmarket.org).  To date, this is the 
  9  10
most detailed publicly available data on financial and outreach performance of microfinance 
institutions.  At the time of data collection, it had listed the profiles of over 130 MFIs from over 
62 countries for the period 1998-2002, which resulted in about 350 individual annual MFI 
observations.  
Rating data was collected from several sources. First, the CGAP Rating Fund 
(www.ratingfund.org) lists MFI name, rater and the year in which rating was conducted for all 
MFIs who have received financial support for the rating.  This database includes the following 
raters: ACCION, M-CRIL, Microfinanza Ltd., MicroRate, and Planet Rating.  These raters were 
contacted and kindly provided data on what organization they rated and in what year.  Their data 
were merged with the data profiles of individual MFIs from the MIX MARKET information 
exchange platform.  
Rating is recorded for the year for which it was conducted but in most cases rating was 
based on financial statements for the preceding years.  For example, if an MFI was rated in 2000 
it was recorded as rated in 2000, although the rater actually used financial statements for the 
years up to and including 1999.  All raters who provided information confirmed that in most 
cases pervious years’ financial statements were used.  In cases of mid-year rating, the rater used 
past years as well as current mid-year indicators of performance.  This recording of rating 
permits to study the impact of rating on performance in the immediate period after rating 
occurred and for which data was available. 
A study of the impact of rating must rely on an appropriate control group.  The data 
collected by MIX MARKET are very appropriate for this purpose.  MFIs with listed financial 
and outreach profiles (and in many cases posted audited financial statements) have elected to 
participate usually motivated by the possibility that potential investors may review their profile   11
and select them for funding.  Thus, all listed MFIs have identified themselves as seeking funds 
and as being more transparent than MFis that did not provide profiles.  Among these MFIs, not 
all were rated, which permits to study the impact of rating.  Raters provided complete 
information of the MFIs they rated but only a small part of each rater’s clients were part of the 
MIX MARKET database.  Therefore, this paper assumes that the resulting database represent a 
relatively random sample of MFIs transparent in their transactions some of whom  have 
experience with rating and some of whom do not.
4  
Table 1 presents definitions of the variables used in the analysis.  Performance is 
measured in terms of sustainability and outreach. Sustainability is measured by operational self-
sustainability (OSS), which measures how well the MFI can cover its costs through operating 
revenues and OSS is the industry’s most widely used indicator of performance.
5  MFI 
performance in terms of outreach is measured by the log of the number of active borrowers 
(NAB), which is the number of individuals that currently have an outstanding loan balance with 
the MFI.
6  Log difference of equity (EqCh) and log difference of liabilities (LiabCh) are used to 
study whether rating helps MFis raise more funds.
7   
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The core explanatory variables are measures of capital ratio (CAPITAL), MFI age (AGE) 
and MFIs size measured as the log of total assets (SIZE), loans-to-asset (LOAN), and savings 
(deposits) ratio (SAVINGS).
8   Macroeconomic variables that control for the impact of general 
economic conditions are per capita GDP (PCGDP) and inflation rate (INFLATION), these 
variables are in constant 1995 US dollars.  Among the variables representing MFIs’ profiles 
(excluding age), SIZE is not a ratio; thus, the value of total assets entering SIZE is adjusted for 
inflation using the US CPI.    12
Table 2 presets summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis for 
years when the MFIs were not rated versus years when the MFIs were rated, and by rater.  This 
table is organized in two panels: Panel A presents the summary statistics of current year 
individual MFI profiles used in the estimation of (1), and Panel B presents the summary statistics 
of previous year individual MFI profiles used in the estimation of (2). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
During the study period, of the 139 MFIs, 37 were rated at least once.  In total, the 
database contains 85 ratings, among which 39 ratings that received financial support from the 
CGAP Rating Fund.  At the time of rating, MFIs had higher OSS, NAB and loan-to-assets ratios, 
they were older and larger.  However, there is no statistically significant difference between the 
rated and non-rated groups in terms of their capital structure and risk profile measured by the 
portfolio-at-risk variable and in terms of change in equity and liability.  Means by individual 
rater, at time of rating, show significant variations and suggests that the analysis should control 
for the use of a specific rater. 
 
Discussion of the results 
Results from estimation of (1) with performance measured in terms of sustainability, that is, with 
OSS as the dependent variable are presented in Table 3.  Results from estimation of (1) with NAB 
as a measure the impact of rating on outreach are presented in Table 4.  Breusch-Pagan tests 
shown at the bottom of these tables indicate that the random effect model should be used.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Model 1 in Table 3 represents a specification where the impact of rating is captured only 
by RATE—the simple dummy variable for rating—while Model 2 adds to this specification   13
FinAid, which is the dummy variable for subsidized rating.  These two models indicate that 
rating had no effect on sustainability.  Not all raters are equal, however, as results from Model 3-
6 of Table 3 indicate.  More importantly, the impact of individual raters can be negative, as in 
Model 3 and Model 4, indicating that rating by this rater may induce moral hazard, and positive 
as in Model 5 and Model 6 indicating the presence of market discipline.  As the correlation 
between individual raters and subsidized rating is high, these results are not robust—adding 
FinAid makes the negative coefficient on rater4 statistically insignificant but makes the impact 
of rater2 statistically significant.
9  These results are not surprising given that individual 
microfinance raters employ different rating methodologies.  
The economic impact of rating by various raters is also significant—MFIs rated by 
Rater4 have in the period after rating OSS that is with 0.54-0.55 points less than MFIs that were 
not rated by this rater, everything else equal according to Models 3&4.  On the other hand, 
everything else equal, MFIs rated by Rater2 have in the period after rating OSS that is with 0.67 
points more than MFIs that were not rated by this rater, according to Models 5&6. 
Overall, the specifications in Table 3 fit the data reasonably well as indicated by the high 
R-squared (0.55), thus providing support for the use of this approach to study MFI performance.  
Results also indicate that better capitalized MFIs perform better, and there is some weak 
evidence that MFIs serving riskier borrowers perform slightly better (the coefficient on PAR is 
positive in Models 3 and 4). Evidence also suggests that larger and older MFIs do better but the 
impact of age is reversed after the 17
th year.  
Results in Models 3 and 4 also indicate that deposit insurance has a positive impact on 
OSS. According to results in models 3 and 4, even after controlling for country income and 
inflation level, MFIs operating in a country with deposit insurance scheme such as India would   14
have OSS higher by 0.23 percentage points than MFIs operating in a country without deposit 
insurance scheme such as Pakistan.  This result is counter-intuitive but it may indicate that in 
developing countries enforcement of the law is more important than laws on the book. In 
addition, this result is significant only at 10 percent level and not significant in Models 1 and 2. 
Results here show that MFIs operating in inflationary environment have learned to use it 
to their advantage as indicated by the positive and significant sign on the coefficient of inflation.  
These results are consistent with results from cross-country studies on financial intermediaries 
(Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004; Barth, Noelle, Phumiwasana and Yago, 2003). 
While rating by a microfinance rater seems to impact outreach, individual raters do not 
(Table 4).  Results show that in the period following rating, MFIs were able to improve their 
outreach.  When the impact of the subsidized rating is accounted for, however, the overall impact 
is slightly negative; that is, rated MFIs did achieve better outreach. MFIs that received financial 
aid for their rating did not fare better, and in fact did slightly worse.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
As in the case of MFI sustainability, the impact of MFI capitalization and its size on 
outreach is positive.  As expected, MFis with higher level of loan-to-total assets ratio reach more 
borrowers.  MFIs operating as banks reach fewer borrowers than non-bank financial institutions 
which indicate that MFIs registered as banks focus more on profits, thank on outreach.  
Macroeconomic factors do not seem to influence MFI outreach.  
Rating agencies also differ in terms of their impact on MFIs’ ability to attract additional 
funding.  Results from estimating Equation (2) are presented in Table 5.  They indicate that only 
MFIs that were rated by Rater No.5 were able to borrow significantly more resources.  No rater 
helped MFIs to raise equity, however.   15
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Results in Table 5 also indicate that, as expected, better capitalized MFIs were able to 
raise more debt, but less equity.  MFIs with higher focus on lending (higher loan-to-assets ratio), 
and higher proportion of their liability raised from deposits also raised more debt.  Smaller MFIs 
were able to raise more capital in terms of both debt and equity.  MFIs in countries with deposit 
insurance raised more debt perhaps because big lenders felt that the government guarantees 
decrease default risk.  Finally, MFI registered as banks were able to raise more equity than MFIs 
registered as non-bank financial intermediaries. 
Overall, results indicate that microfinance rating has impact on MFI performance in 
terms of outreach and sustainability and on MFIs’ ability to raise funds.  Moreover, results 
indicate that not all raters are equal and while some rating methodologies may help impose 
market discipline and thus help MFIs raise additional debt, others may induce moral hazard.  
There are some weak evidence that subsidizing rating decreases its effectiveness and may 
actually lead to moral hazard; that is, once an MFis finds a grant to get rated, it slacks off and in 
the next reaches less poor borrowers.   
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution. First, data constraints do not 
permit to test whether the type of evaluation that an MFI received affects its performance.  
Specifically, it is not possible to tell whether an MFI with better rating has less incentives to 
improve than and MFI with worse rating. Results only indicate that after rating by a rater, an 
MFIs could do better or worse depending on which rater it used.  Data quality is also an issue, as 
about 25 MFIs provide data only prior to rating but not after rating so the impact of their rating is 
hard to tell and it makes results more dependent on rating up to 2001.  Since the industry has 
evolved substantially since 2001, more recent data, larger sample, and if possible latter grade of   16
the specific rating that and MFI received would help understand better the impact of rating in 
microfinance.  
  
Conclusions   
In spite of the fact that developed countries have invested about $900 million in microfinance, 
very little is known about the effectiveness of the mechanisms designed to exercise control over 
the use of these resources.  This paper focuses on the ability of microfinance rating agencies to 
impose market discipline on microfinance institutions and their managers by rating these 
organizations’ performance.  
Results indicate that not all rating agencies are equal as only one was able to impose 
market discipline by promoting better sustainability, while rating by another agency caused 
MFIs to slack off.  In addition, while rating in general lead to better outreach, this effect was 
annulled if MFIs received financial aid for the rating.  Only rating by one microfinance rater 
helped MFIs raise additional debt.  These results suggest that rating has impact on MFI 
sustainability, outreach and fundraising and may serve as a powerful mechanism of external 
control.  When more recent data become available, further studies on microfinance rating need to 
incorporate the newly introduced numerical and letter grades to identify microfinance raters and 
rating methodologies that are most effective in imposing market discipline.    17




1 Microfinance institutions provide mainly loans but also other financial services such as deposit and payment 
facilities to poor people in developing countries.   
2 Debenture is type of bond issued to raise funds from the market. 
3 This information is based on personal correspondence with two microfinance raters. 
4 All information on time of rating comes from the raters themselves.  This is important because the MIX MARKET 
data contains information on rating but this information is incomplete (no specific date of rating provided, failure to 
disclose a second rater, etc.)  
5 The Mixmarket information platform ranks the quality of the data collected for each MFI.  The data for this 
analysis come from MFIs ranked 4 and 5 stars, which indicates that the data are from audited financial statements, 
presumably with standard industry adjustment applied to it.  There is no qualitative difference between 4 and 5 
except that 5 have at least 3 years of financial statements report, while 4 have less than three years.  
6 The number of active borrowers, however, represents only one dimension of outreach.  To some stakeholders, the 
ability to reach poorer borrowers may be a better indicator of outreach than simply the number of active borrowers.  
The industry standard for this dimension is “depth of outreach” calculated as the ratio of average outstanding loan 
size divided by the per capita GNP.  Regression on a smaller sample with depth of outreach as the dependent 
produced poor results, however. 
7 LaibCh captures changes in borrowed funds from sources other than deposits.  
8 The lending practices of some MFIs require mandatory savings from their borrowers.  Only 4 MFIs in the sample 
explicitly indicated this but evidence suggests that there are more MFIs which use mandatory savings.  
Unfortunately, the data does not allow credible distinction between mandatory and voluntary savings.  
9 The higher degree of correlation between the rating variables does not permit specifying intercept in every model.   18
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Table 1. Variable definition:  
Variable Definition 
OSS  Operational self-sufficiency = Operating revenue / (Financial expense + Loan 
Loss Provision + Operating Expense). Measures how well the MFI can cover its 
costs through operating revenues 
NAB  Logarithm of the number of current borrowers, that is the number of individuals 
that currently have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI or are responsible 
for repaying any portion of the gross loan portfolio 
RATING  1 if rated in the current year; usually based on previous years financial statements 
FinAid  1 if rating was paid for partially or in full by CGAP Rating Fund  
Rater1   Rating by Rater No.1 etc. recorded in the year it occurred 
CAPITAL  Total equity to total assets 
AGE; AGE2  Age of the MFI = number of years since inception; Age2=age squared  
SIZE  Logarithm of the total assets of the MFI. Total assets include all assets net of 
contra asset accounts such as the loan loss reserve and accumulated depreciation. 
SAVINGS  Ratio of saving to total assets 
LOAN  Ratio of loans outstanding to total assets; measures risk exposure 
a
DEBT  Debt to Equity Ratio as a measure of risks 
PAR  Portfolio at Risk > 30 days 
BANK  1 if the MFI is organized as a bank, zero otherwise 
NGO  1 if the MFI is a NGO, zero otherwise 
PCGDP  Log GDP Per Capita in constant 1995 US dollars; source IMF 
INFLATION  GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars; source: IMF 
DEPOSIT  1 if the country has deposit insurance schemes 
a Most empirical models that study bank performance include LOAN as a measure of bank risk exposure. Unlike 
banks however, most MFIs do not engage in income generating activities other than lending, therefore, LOAN not 
only controls for risk exposure but also for MFI focus on lending because using funds for other purposes such as 
new buildings, cars etc, is likely to affect income generation..   21
Table 2. Summary statistics by non-rated, rated, and individual rater
a.
 
Panel A. Current Year 













OSS  1.049 1.238*** 1.449  1.228  1.182  1.470 
  (0.550)
 c (0.322) (0.501) (0.262) (0.136) (0.496) 
NAB  8.751 9.593*** 9.901  9.982  7.833  9.350 
  (2.124) (0.928) (0.695) (0.770) (0.660) (0.638) 
LiabCh  0.392 0.437 0.434 0.362 0.316 0.815 
  (0.732) (0.540) (0.472) (0.388) (1.114) (0.793) 
EqCh  0.267 0.196 0.017 0.170 0.277 0.216 
  (0.484) (0.380) (0.563) (0.363) (0.225) (0.343) 
CAPITAL  0.486 0.453 0.495 0.381 0.667 0.612 
  (0.328) (0.264) (0.229) (0.232) (0.315) (0.198) 
LOAN  0.664 0.736** 0.788  0.750  0.868  0.729 
  (0.202) (0.164) (0.180) (0.134) (0.094) (0.145) 
PAR  0.051 0.045 0.048 0.050 0.039 0.012 
  (0.086) (0.045) (0.038) (0.043) (0.025) (0.011) 
SIZE  14.801 16.007*** 16.183  16.444  15.048  15.325 
  (2.038) (1.108) (0.465) (0.892) (0.820) (0.926) 
AGE  7.805 10.051***  11.375  12.000  3.500  5.333 
  (6.544) (5.246) (4.069) (4.913) (1.291) (1.506) 
AGE2  103.641 128.09* 143.875 167.355  13.500  30.333 
  (186.260) (119.117) (122.425) (118.160) (9.110)  (18.074) 
FinAid   0.310  0.000  0.258  1.000  0.500 
   (0.467)  0.000  (0.445)  0.000  (0.548) 
Rater1   0.138  0.032  0.000  0.167 
   (0.347)  (0.180)  0.000  (0.408) 
Rater2   0.017  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.131)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Rater3   0.517  0.125  0.000  0.000 
   (0.504)  (0.354)   0.000  0.000 
Rater4   0.069  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.255)  0.000  0.000    0.000 
Rater5   0.121  0.125  0.000  0.000  
   (0.328)  (0.354)  0.000  0.000   
DEPOSIT  0.539 0.767 0.875 0.750 0.667 0.500 
  (0.499) (0.427) (0.354) (0.444) (0.577) (0.548) 
a  Rater 2 is not included due to the limited number of observations (2), 
b Means are estimated for the year for which 
rating occurred,  
c Standard errors are in the parenthesis. 
*difference in means between rated and non-rated statistically significant at the 10% level, ** difference in means 
between rated and non-rated statistically significant at the 5% level, ***difference in means between rated and non-
rated statistically significant at the 1% level    22
Table 2. Summary statistics by non-rated, rated, and individual rater
a.
 
















c 1.018  1.171**  1.328 1.171 1.050 1.411 
  (0.532)
d (0.294) (0.444) (0.258) (0.297) (0.496) 
L_NABb  8.549  9.269***  9.824 9.612 7.545 8.893 
  (2.166) (1.049)  (0.767)  (0.857) (0.552) (0.508) 
L_CAPITAL  0.498  0.498 0.604 0.408 0.709 0.721 
  (0.330) (0.291)  (0.282)  (0.252) (0.301) (0.206) 
L_LOAN  0.656  0.723*  0.899 0.727 0.850 0.692 
  (0.206) (0.179)  (0.053)  (0.132) (0.069) (0.181) 
L_PAR  0.052  0.045 0.042 0.052 0.046 0.032 
  (0.080) (0.043)  (0.038)  (0.043) (0.026) (0.069) 
L_ DEBT  1.659  2.463 2.090 2.666 0.697 1.317 
  (10.200) (2.629)  (2.634)  (2.170) (0.937) (2.513) 
L_ SAVINGS   0.142  0.144 0.090 0.159 0.000 0.052 
  (0.222) (0.222)  (0.239)  (0.216) (0.000) (0.135) 
L_SIZE  14.602  15.722***  16.031 16.198 14.682 14.939 
  (2.043) (1.233)  (0.451)  (0.948) (0.889) (0.902) 
L_AGE  7.076 9.125***  10.571  11.276  2.500  4.333 
  (6.387) (5.312)  (4.353)  (4.935) (1.291) (1.506) 
a Rater 2 is not included due to the limited number of observations (2) 
b Means are estimated for the year for which rating occurred. 
c L stands for the variable lagged one period. 
d Standard errors are in the parenthesis.
 
* difference in means between rated and non-rated statistically significant at the 10% level,  
** difference in means between rated and non-rated statistically significant at the 5% level,  
*** difference in means between rated and non-rated statistically significant at the 1% level    23
 Table 3. Random effect estimates of rating impact on sustainability, measured by OSS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RATING   -0.044  -0.040      
  (0.54)  (0.39)      
FinAid   -0.008    -0.160  -0.193 
   (0.06)    (0.98)  (1.12) 
Rater1      0.089 0.091 0.245 0.279 
      (0.47) (0.47) (0.99) (1.09) 
Rater2      0.524 0.526 0.678 0.713 
     (1.51)  (1.49)  (1.78)*  (1.82)* 
Rater3      0.004 0.003 0.022 0.023 
      (0.04) (0.02) (0.20) (0.20) 
Rater4     -0.541  -0.551  -0.392  -0.373 
     (2.37)**  (2.36)**  (1.43)  (1.33) 
Rater5      0.133 0.097 0.226 0.193 
      (0.83) (0.54) (1.21) (0.98) 
CAPITAL  0.242 0.246 0.265 0.310 0.274 0.322 
  (1.77)*  (1.79)*  (1.98)** (2.15)** (2.04)** (2.23)** 
DEBT  -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.93) (0.92) (0.67) (0.62) (0.66) (0.60) 
PAR  0.479 0.480 0.545 0.646 0.553 0.653 
  (1.41) (1.41)  (1.65)*  (1.88)*  (1.68)*  (1.91)* 
LOAN  -0.023 -0.025 -0.075 -0.097 -0.087 -0.115 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.37) (0.45) (0.43) (0.53) 
SAVINGS       0.003  -0.008 
       (0.01)  (0.03) 
SIZE  0.132 0.132 0.130 0.138 0.131 0.139 
  (4.06)*** (4.05)*** (4.04)*** (3.94)*** (4.04)*** (3.94)*** 
AGE  0.069 0.069 0.067 0.062 0.068 0.064 
  (4.10)*** (4.06)*** (3.94)*** (3.43)*** (3.98)*** (3.48)*** 
AGE2  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (4.55)*** (4.51)*** (4.39)*** (3.94)*** (4.44)*** (4.01)*** 
NGO  0.212 0.212 0.206 0.229 0.208 0.234 
  (1.92)* (1.91)* (1.85)* (1.84)* (1.86)* (1.86)* 
BANK  -0.145 -0.146 -0.149 -0.172 -0.151 -0.172 
  (0.76) (0.76) (0.78) (0.84) (0.78) (0.84) 
DEPOSIT  0.156 0.156 0.236 0.264 0.233 0.261 
  (1.16) (1.16)  (1.77)*  (1.85)*  (1.75)*  (1.84)* 
PCDGP  0.490 0.489 0.575 0.610 0.574 0.611 
  (1.53)  (1.53)  (2.01)** (2.04)** (2.01)** (2.05)** 
INFLATION  1.221 1.223 1.271 1.265 1.267 1.255 
  (2.78)*** (2.78)*** (3.04)*** (2.94)*** (3.03)*** (2.93)*** 
Constant  -6.302  -7.078  -7.518    
  (2.39)**   (2.99)***  (3.04)***     
Year dummy  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Country dummy  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
Observations  285 285 297 278 297 278 
Groups  104 104 104 100 104 100 
Overall R2  0.547 0.545 0.546 0.554 0.545 0.554 
F-test  185.23 1242.47 194.64  174.93  193.88 1081.28 
Rho   0.434 0.441 0.468 0.492 0.478 0.503 
Breusch-Pagan   25.65 25.60 31.63 25.61 32.27 26.31 
Absolute value of T statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   24
Table 4. Random effect estimates of rating impact on outreach, measured by NAB 
  (1) (2) (3) (3) 
RATING  0.162 0.283    
  (1.75)* (2.56)**     
FinAid   -0.295   -0.084 
   (1.96)**   (0.43) 
Rater1    -0.071  0.014 
    (0.29)  (0.04) 
Rater2    0.055  0.139 
    (0.12)  (0.27) 
Rater3    0.064  0.078 
    (0.56)  (0.66) 
Rater4    -0.274  -0.197 
    (0.92)  (0.57) 
Rater5    0.052  0.094 
    (0.22)  (0.37) 
CAPITAL  0.411 0.419 0.533 0.533 
  (2.16)** (2.21)** (2.75)***  (2.74)*** 
DEBT  -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 
  (1.25) (1.23) (0.91) (0.91) 
PAR  0.459 0.428 0.381 0.372 
  (1.07) (1.01) (0.86) (0.84) 
LOAN  1.403 1.345 1.320 1.308 
  (5.19)*** (4.98)*** (4.76)*** (4.69)*** 
SAVINGS  0.291 0.297 0.282 0.286 
  (1.02) (1.05) (0.97) (0.99) 
SIZE  0.869 0.864 0.876 0.874 
  (15.23)*** (15.16)*** (15.43)*** (15.35)*** 
AGE  0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 
  (0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) 
NGO   0.288 0.289 0.266 0.266 
  (1.14) (1.14) (1.11) (1.10) 
BANK  -0.681 -0.684 -0.666 -0.666 
  (1.76)* (1.75)* (1.80)* (1.79)* 
PCGDP  0.280 0.325 0.115 0.118 
  (0.75) (0.88) (0.33) (0.34) 
INFLATION  -0.138 -0.086 -0.266 -0.265 
  (0.27) (0.17) (0.51) (0.51) 
Constant  -8.173 -9.752    
  (2.59)*** (3.18)***    
      
Year dummy  yes yes yes yes 
      
Country dummy  yes yes yes yes 
      
Observations  319 319 334 334 
Groups  116 116 116 116 
Overall R2  0.892 0.891 0.891 0.891 
F-test  1083.02 1084.23 17382.76  17113.79 
Rho   0.790 0.797 0.775 0.759 
Breusch-Pagan   88.24 90.11 98.07 88.69 
Absolute value of T statistics in parentheses        
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         
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Table 5. OLS of rating impact on log changes in liability and equity. 
















Constant  -2.859 -2.870 -2.263 -2.198  3.917 3.887 3.711 3.692 
  (0.46)  (0.46)  (0.37)  (0.36) (0.69) (0.68) (0.65) (0.65) 
RATING  -0.161 -0.038     0.042 0.004    
  (0.88)  (0.16)      (0.38) (0.03)    
FinAid   -0.269   -0.385    0.082    0.028 
   (0.81)   (1.06)    (0.41)    (0.13) 
Rater1      -0.666  -0.376    0.441  0.419 
      (1.45)  (0.70)    (1.56)  (1.27) 
Rater2      -0.927  -0.627    -0.453  -0.475 
      (1.15)  (0.73)    (0.91)  (0.90) 
Rater3      0.024  0.084    0.092  0.088 
      (0.10)  (0.33)    (0.61)  (0.56) 
Rater4      -0.786  -0.424    0.324  0.297 
      (1.07)  (0.52)    (0.79)  (0.64) 
Rater5      0.789  0.975    -0.209  -0.223 
      (2.06)**  (2.31)**    (0.90)  (0.86) 
L_CAPITAL  1.042  1.048  0.943  0.944  -0.423 -0.428 -0.436 -0.437 
  (3.62)***  (3.64)***  (3.28)***  (3.28)***  (2.05)** (2.06)** (2.11)** (2.10)** 
L_DEBT  -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.016  0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
  (1.06)  (1.05)  (1.06)  (1.08) (1.41) (1.39) (1.42) (1.41) 
L_LOAN  0.773  0.843  0.920  0.968 0.375 0.354 0.313 0.309 
  (1.70)*  (1.81)*  (1.99)**  (2.08)**  (1.34) (1.24) (1.09) (1.07) 
L_PAR  0.404  0.357  0.466  0.367  -0.705 -0.692 -0.794 -0.785 
  (0.37)  (0.33)  (0.43)  (0.34) (0.95) (0.93) (1.07) (1.05) 
L_SAVINGS  1.382 1.324 1.393 1.359  -0.002  0.014  -0.022  -0.020 
  (3.06)***  (2.89)***  (3.12)***  (3.04)***  (0.01) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
L_SIZE  -0.132 -0.133 -0.150 -0.146  -0.148 -0.147 -0.148 -0.148 
  (2.01)**  (2.01)**  (2.29)**  (2.24)**  (3.79)*** (3.76)*** (3.78)*** (3.77)*** 
L_AGE  -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010  -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.65)  (0.65)  (0.81)  (0.82) (0.46) (0.46) (0.24) (0.24) 
NGO  -0.058 -0.064 -0.097 -0.111 -0.004 -0.004 0.021  0.022 
  (0.26)  (0.28)  (0.44)  (0.50) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.18) 
BANK  -0.417 -0.425 -0.393 -0.418  0.464 0.466 0.465 0.467 
  (1.30)  (1.32)  (1.24)  (1.31)  (2.36)** (2.37)** (2.38)** (2.37)** 
L_DEPOSIT  0.897  0.991  1.598  1.595  -0.395 -0.414 -0.545 -0.544 
  (1.56)  (1.69)*  (2.20)**  (2.20)**  (1.29) (1.34) (1.53) (1.52) 
PCGDP  -0.266 -0.292 -0.459 -0.480  -0.197 -0.191 -0.144 -0.142 
  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.41)  (0.42) (0.29) (0.28) (0.21) (0.21) 
INFLATION  2.282  2.371  1.673  1.621  -2.181 -2.214 -2.358 -2.355 
  (0.85)  (0.88)  (0.62)  (0.60) (1.41) (1.43) (1.51) (1.50) 


































             
Observations  178  178  178  178 190 190 190 190 
R2  0.83  0.83  0.84  0.84 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.48 
Adjusted R2  0.751  0.751  0.757  0.757 0.246 0.241 0.249 0.243 
F-test  11.08  10.86  10.68  10.52  2.14 2.09 2.08 2.01 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 